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LIFE AFTER ADARAND. WHAT HAPPENED TO THE METRO
BROADCASTING DIVERSITY RATIONALE FOR AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS OWNERSHIP?
Leonard M. Baynes*
The United States Supreme Court severely restricted affirmative action policies in
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena. In this opinion, a majority of the Court
held that all state or federally mandated affirmative action programs are to be
analyzed under strict scrutiny. This test requires affirmative action programs to
meet a compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored.
Adarand raised issues concerning the validity of the Federal Communications
Commission's affirmative action ownership policies. Previously, the Court in
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC found the FCC minority ownership policies
constitutional under a lower (intermediate) standard of review. In Adarand, the
Court specifically overruled the use of intermediate scrutiny in Metro Broadcast-
ing, casting into doubt the FCC's affirmative action policies. Adarand suggests
that past discrimination may be the only constitutionally viable basis for affirma-
tive action programs. Because many FCC affirmative action programs are based
on diversity, this ruling calls those programs into question.
Many constitutional law scholars, civil rights advocates, and industry leaders
have speculated about what, if anything the FCC can do to deal with this compli-
cated legal issue. This Article suggests a doctrinal and policy solution to this
affirmative action dilemma. The Article identifies and describes the current status
of each of the FCC's affirmative action programs; summarizes the current status of
affirmative action law and how it generally applies to the FCC programs; and
then suggests that the FCC conduct studies identifying instances of past (or pres-
ent) discrimination that will help the FCC establish a compelling governmental
interest, which may satisfy the first prong of the Supreme Court's currant affirma-
tive action test.
INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1970s, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) has had several programs in place to increase ownership of
broadcast and other spectra by women and members of minority
groups. These affirmative action programs have been justified on
the grounds that, given the correlation between the racial and
* Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. B.S. 1979, New
York University;J.D. 1982, Columbia Law School; M.BA. 1983, Columbia Business School.
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ethnic status of the broadcast owner and the station's program-
ming, it is important to increase the number of minority- and
women-owned broadcast stations. The Supreme Court agreed with
this analysis for affirmative action programs in Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCC.' Using the intermediate level of scrutiny, the Court
found that two FCC affirmative action programs were constitu-
tional. These programs were: (1) the distress sale policy, which
created a market only of minorities for a station that was in jeop-
ardy of losing its license; and (2) the comparative hearings policy,
which gave prospective licensees a "plus" for being either a mem-
ber of a racial minority group or a woman. All this changed,
however, when the Supreme Court issued its decision in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena' holding that all government affirmative
action programs would be analyzed under strict scrutiny and spe-
cifically overruling the intermediate standard of review used in
Metro Broadcasting. The confluence of these decisions presents the
FCC with complex choices for implementing any future affirmative
action programs. These decisions raise the question of whether
diversity, a long-held basis for many FCC rules regulating broadcast
ownership, is still a sufficient basis for establishing affirmative ac-
tion programs.
Historically, whites had a virtual monopoly on broadcast owner-
ship.s There were no minority-owned radio stations until 1949
when the FCC awarded a license to radio station WERD and its
owner, Jesse Blayton, in Atlanta.4 There were no minority-owned
TV stations until 1973, when the FCC awarded a license for WGPR-
Detroit to a minority-owned business.5 In 1978, when the FCC
adopted its affirmative action policy, approximately .05%, or forty
6broadcast licenses, were held by minority-owned businesses. In
1996, minority-owned businesses owned approximately 3.1% of
broadcast properties, but this percentage decreased to 2.9% in
1998 . This decline is attributable to consolidation in the radio in-
1. 497 U.S. 547, 567-68 (1990).
2. 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
3. See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1707, 1707-91
(1993) (discussing historical examples of how whiteness evolved into property ownership,
giving whites advantages over members of minority groups).
4. See Antoinette Cook Bush & Marc S. Martin, The FCC's Minority Ownership Policies
from Broadcasting to PCS, 48 FED. COMM. L.J. 423, 424 (1996).
5. See id. at 424.
6. See id.
7. See National Telecommunications and Information Administration, United States
Department of Commerce, Minority Commercial Broadcast Ownershsip in the United States
(visited May 16, 2000) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/opadhome/minown98/main.htm> (on
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dustry, which pressured small broadcast stations to sell or expand
their properties in order to become more competitive. The first
woman broadcast owner, Marie Zimmerman, owned a radio station
in Vinton, Iowa, in 1922.8 Because of lack of funds and strong
competition, she held the license for less than one year.9 Only six
radio stations owned by non-minority women have been recently
identified.' °
Given the new legal terrain for affirmative action programs
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Adarand and the economic
pressures on minority- and women-owned broadcasters to sell their
stations to market consolidators, it is important for the FCC to do
something to increase diversity of ownership of broadcast stations.
The FCC is, however, in a difficult situation because establishing an
affirmative action program creates legal and political risks (as will
be seen below): since the Supreme Court decided Adarand, no de-
partment of the federal government has done a study justifying
affirmative action programs. The different departments have en-
gaged in internal reviews of their programs with members of a
Justice Department Task Force." The Justice Department issued a
Public Notice 12 entitled Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action in Fed-
eral Procurement'3 These Reforms addressed more specifically the
narrow tailoring prong of the Adarand test.
4
The Justice Department issued an opinion stating that it was un-
necessary to focus on the first part of the Adarand test dealing with
compelling state interest because there was a wealth of support for
finding a compelling state interest for affirmative action programs
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (summarizing results of 1997-1998
ownership survey).
8. See Donna Halper, Marie Zimmerman-Broadcasting's First Female Owner (visited Feb.
27, 2000) <http://www.oldradio.com/archives/people/zimmerman.html> (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
9. See id.
10. See Civil Rights Forum on Communications Policy, When Being No. 1 Is Not Enough:
The Impact of Advertising Practices on Minority-Owned & Minority-Formatted Broadcast Stations, at
16 (Jan. 1999). Determining the number and identity of the female-owned stations is diffi-
cult because, although the National Telecommunications and Information Administration
publishes an annual list of minority-owned stations, it does not do so for female-owned sta-
tions. See id. In addition, the FCC did not require broadcasters to report their gender or race
until October 1998. See id.
11. See generally Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement, 61
Fed. Reg. 26,042 (1996).
12. This proposal was designed to be a model for amending the affirmative action pro-
visions of the Federal Acquisition Regulation and the Defense Federal Acquisition
Regulation Supplement. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 26,045-48.
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in federal procurement. The Justice Department said the follow-
ing:
Based upon [a number of] congressional actions, the legisla-
tive history supporting them, and the evidence available to
Congress, this congressional judgment is credible and constitution-
ally defensible. Indeed, the survey of currently available
evidence conducted by the Justice Department since the Ada-
rand decision, including the review of numerous specific
studies of discrimination conducted by state and local gov-
ernments throughout the nation, leads to the conclusion that,
in the absence of affirmative remedial efforts, federal contracting
would unquestionably reflect the continuing impact of discrimination
that has persisted over an extended period. For purposes of these
proposed reforms, therefore, the Justice Department takes as
a constitutionally justified premise that affirmative action in fed-
eral procurement is necessary, and that the federal government has a
compelling interest to act on that basis in the award of federal
contracts.
15
For the FCC, the Adarand decision presents a different and more
complex situation because the FCC, unlike other federal agencies,
does not have a wealth of findings of discrimination against its li-
censees. Historically, the FCC has rested its affirmative action
programs almost solely on the grounds of broadcast and ownership
diversity. In several recent cases, the Supreme Court suggested that
this rationale may no longer be a compelling governmental inter-
est.
This Article addresses what the FCC can do now to deal with
these issues. In Part I, the Article explores the current and former
FCC affirmative action programs. Parts II and III examine and ana-
lyze current and past Supreme Court and lower court cases dealing
with the constitutionality of affirmative action programs. Part IV
looks at the requirements for affirmative action programs for
women. Finally, the Article concludes that performing a studydemonstrating past discrimination 16 is the best way for the FCC to
15. Id. (emphasis added).
16. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1989) (noting that
Richmond introduced a statistical study program to adopt its set-aside ordinances, which
indicated that while 50% of the city's population was black, only 0.67% of its prime con-
struction contracts had been awarded to minority businesses in the last five years). The
majority also noted, however, that the statistical study did not provide a strong basis for con-
cluding that remedial action was required. See id. at 501.
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satisfy the first prong of the Adarand test to establish a compelling
governmental interest.
I. CURRENT AND FORMER FCC AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION PROGRAMS
The FCC has employed affirmative action programs in three ar-
eas: (1) commercial broadcasting; (2) wireless spectrum-based
services; and (3) cable. The FCC has justified all of these princi-
pally on the basis of diversity-either viewpoint diversity in the case
of broadcast, and ownership diversity in the case of spectrum-based
services. The wireless spectrum-based services programs have been
justified by discrimination against minorities and women. Congres-
sional action, judicial review, or FCC action have eliminated some
of these programs. The only programs that are still technically in
effect are the distress sale policy and the leased access minority
programming rule; these programs are not currently in use and,
after Adarand, their constitutionality is uncertain.
A. Use of Affirmative Action Programs in Commercial Broadcasting
1. Comparative Hearings-Since 1965 the FCC has stated that the
primary objectives of comparative hearings for mutually-exclusive
commercial broadcast license applications 17 were (1) maximizing
diffusion and diversification of control of mass media communica-
tions; and (2) ensuring the "best practicable service to the public."'
The FCC maintained that one of the most predictive factors in de-
termining which applicant would provide the "best practicable
service" was the integration of ownership into the day-to-day man-
agement of the station. 9 Despite recognizing that owner-managers
were more responsive, the FCC initially refused to credit the mi-
nority ownership status of a license applicant under the integration
criterion, based on the view that "the Communications Act, like the
17. When more than one individual or corporation applied for a license, the FCC held
a hearing in order to consider who was best qualified to receive the license. The license
applications were mutually exclusive in that only one individual could win the license for the
given frequency. See Policy Statement on Comparative Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 394 (1965).
18. Id. at 394.
19. See id. at 395-96. The FCC reasoned that it was desirable that the party legally
responsible for the station also be responsible for day-to-day management, and that owner-
managers would be more attuned and responsive to the listening needs of the local audi-
ence. See id.
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Constitution, is color blind [and] ... [minority] ownership must
be shown on the record to result in some [independent] public
interest benefit. 20 In response to the D.C. Circuit's decision in TV
9, Inc. v. FCC,2' the FCC began considering ownership and partici-
pation in station management by members of minority groups as
one of several factors in the comparative hearing proceedings. The
FCC adopted the minority integration credit as an enhancement of
the integration credit because it perceived "an extreme disparity
between the representation of minorities in our population and in
the broadcasting industry....
Although women applicants for mutually-exclusive broadcast li-
censes did not initially receive enhancement credits for their
gender status, the FCC's Review Board soon extended this en-
hancement to women. The credit enhancement policy for gender
20. Mid-Florida Television Corp., 33 F.C.C.2d 1, 17-18 (Rev. Bd. 1972), review denied,
37 F.C.C.2d 559 (1972), rev'd sub nom. TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
21. 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In TV 9, an unsuccessful African American applicant
for a radio license challenged the FCC's refusal to consider the minority ownership as an
integration factor. See id. at 938 (finding that the racial identity of the African American
prospective licensees was a relevant consideration in choosing between and among appli-
cants); see also Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68
F.C.C.2d 979, 983-84 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Policy Statement].
22. 1978 Policy Statement, supra note 21, at 983-84.
23. See Gainesville Media, Inc., 70 F.C.C.2d 143, 149 (Rev. Bd. 1978). In Gainesville, the
FCC initially stated:
In our Decision we held that since there was no evidence in the record of the extent
of female ownership in the mass media in Gainesville, we had no basis on which to
conclude that such participation would achieve a public interest benefit. Upon fur-
ther reflection, we now believe the better course is to consider female ownership and
participation, despite the absence of record evidence regarding the ownership situa-
tions at other stations.
Id.
One month following the Review Board's decision in Gainesville, the Review Board of-
fered the following rationale for extending enhancement credit to women:
We hold that merit for female ownership and participation is warranted upon essen-
tially the same basis as the merit given for black ownership and participation, but that
it is a merit of lesser significance.... Women are a general population group which
has suffered from a discriminatory attitude in various fields of activity, and one which,
partly as a consequence, has certain separate needs and interests with respect to
which the inclusion of women in broadcast ownership and operation can be of value.
On the other hand, it is equally obvious that the need for diversity and sensitivity re-
flected in the structure of a broadcast station is not so pressing with respect to women
as it is with respect to blacks-women have not been excluded from the mainstream
of society as have black people.
Mid-Florida Television Corp., 70 F.C.C.2d 281, 326 (Rev. Bd. 1978), set aside on other grounds,
87 F.C.C.2d 203 (1981).
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continued until 1992,2 when the policy was struck as violative of
the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment in Lamprecht v.
FCC by a threejudge panel led by then-Judge Clarence Thomas.
The Lamprecht court reasoned that "any 'predictive judgments'
concerning group behavior and the differences among different
groups must at the very least be sustained by meaningful evidence"
to withstand equal protection scrutiny. 26 The Lamprecht court found
that the FCC's consideration of gender as a "plus factor" in com-
parative hearings was without any evidence that established a
statistically meaningful link between woman ownership and the
27programming format of a station.
In Bechtel v. FCC,25 the D.C. Circuit invalidated the entire
ownership integration credit criterion including the remaining
race considerations. The court reasoned that the "policy of
awarding preferences to applicants who intend to personally
manage and operate a proposed station is 'particularly without
foundation.' ,29 In 1994, the FCC stayed all ongoing comparative
hearing cases pending resolution of the issues raised in Bechtel.
30
Against this backdrop, Congress, as part of the Balanced Budget
24. The integration credit for gender had previously been invalidated by a panel of the
D.C. Circuit in Steele v. FCC, 770 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1985), on the basis that the FCC had
no authority under the Communications Act to credit gender as an enhancement credit in
the absence of record evidence that female ownership and management necessarily affected
programming choices. A majority of the judges on the D.C. Circuit voted to rehear the case
en banc and vacated the panel's opinion and judgment. See Steele v. FCC, No. 84-1776 (D.C.
Cir. Oct. 31, 1985) (en banc). Prior to the rehearing, the FCC requested that the case be
remanded to afford it an opportunity to seek comment and compile record evidence on the
wisdom and effectiveness of its race and gender policies. The court remanded the case, and
the FCC initiated a notice of inquiry on the subject. See Reexamination of the Commission's
Comparative Licensing, Distress Sales, and Tax Certificate Policies Premised on Racial Eth-
nic or Gender Classifications, Notice of Inquiry, 1 F.C.C.R. 1315 (1986), modified, 2 F.C.C.R.
2377 (1987). After the inquiry was initiated, Congress essentially froze this inquiry through a
rider to the Continuing Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1988, which ordered that
none of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used to repeal, to retroactively
apply changes in, or to continue a reexamination of, the policies of the Federal
Communications Commission with respect to comparative licensing, distress sales
and tax certificates... to expand minority and women ownership of broadcasting li-
censes.., other than to close [the pending reexamination] with a reinstatement of
the prior policy.
Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329-31 (1987).
25. 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
26. Id. at 393.
27. See id. at 393-98.
28. 10 F.3d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
29. Id. at 887.
30. See FCC Freezes Comparative Hearings, 9 F.C.C.R. 1055 (1994), modified, 9 F.C.C.R.
6689 (1994), further modified, 10 F.C.C.R. 12,182 (1995).
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Act of 1997, amended Section 309(j) of the Communications Act
expressly to require that the FCC use competitive bidding
procedures to resolve most initial licensing proceedings involving
mutually-exclusive applications for commercial broadcast licenses."
The FCC has complied with the Congressional mandate.32 In
addition, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 eliminated
comparative hearings for renewals of incumbent licensees.
3
2. Minority Tax Certificate Policy--In 1978, the FCC imple-
mented the minority tax certificate policy, which provided
incentives to owners of existing broadcast properties to sell their
properties to minorities." The tax certificate program allowed the
seller to defer any gain realized on the sale if the property was sold
to a minority purchaser, and the gain was rolled over into a quali-
fied replacement broadcast property.
Like the minority integration credit in the comparative hearing
context, the FCC based the tax certificate policy on the need to
correct the extreme disparity between the proportion of minorities
in the United States population and the number of minority
31. See Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 3002, 111 Stat. 251, 258-59 (1997). In addition, the 1997
Budget Act added Section 309 (1) of the Communications Act to provide that, with respect to
competing applications for initial licenses for commercial radio and television stations filed
with the FCC before July 1, 1997: (1) the FCC has authority to conduct a competitive bid-
ding proceeding under Section 309(0) to award such licenses or permits; (2) that it must
treat persons filing such applications as the only persons eligible to be qualified bidders; and
(3) that, for a period of 180 days beginning on the date the 1997 Budget Act was enacted,
the FCC must waive any provision of its regulations necessary to permit such persons to
enter into an agreement to procure the removal of a conflict between their applications. See
47 U.S.C. § 309 0) (1994).
32. In re Implementation of Section 3090) of the Communications Act--Competitive
Bidding for Commercial Broadcast & Instructional Television Fixed Service Licenses, 16
Comm. Reg. (P&F) 462 (July 2, 1999).
33. Section 309 (k) (4) provides that the FCC "shall not consider whether the public in-
terest, convenience, and necessity might be served by the grant of a license to a person other
than the renewal applicant." 47 U.S.C. § 309(k) (4) (1996).
34. The tax certificate program was never extended to women. See National Telecom-
munications & Information Admin., 69 F.C.C.2d 1591, 1593 n.9 (1978). The FCC explained
the rationale for not extending the program to women:
We have not concluded that the historical and contemporary disadvantagement [sic]
suffered by women is of the same order, or has the same contemporary conse-
quences, which would justify inclusion of a majority of the nation's population in a
preferential category defined by the presence of "minority groups."
Id.; see also Wuenschel Broadcasting Co., 74 F.C.C.2d 389, 390-91 (1979) (refusing to in-
clude women in a program that expedites the processing of applications filed by minority
applicants).
35. See 1978 Policy Statement, supra note 21, at 982-83; Commission Policy Regarding
the Advancement of Minority Ownership in Broadcasting, 92 F.C.C.2d 849, 849-63 (1982),
proceeding terminated, 99 F.C.C.2d 1249 (1985).
[VOL. 33:1&2
FALL 1999-WINTER 2000]
owners of mass media facilities to promote viewpoint diversity. The
FCC determined that this lack of minority ownership of mass
media facilities was "detrimental not only to the minority audience
but to all of the viewing and listening public."36
Congress repealed the tax certificate program for minorities in
an appropriations rider to the Self Employed Persons Health Care
Extension Act of 1995."7 The legislative history of this rider demon-
strates that Congress believed the certificate program constituted
bad tax policy. For instance, Congress believed that the policy
evolved far beyond what Congress originally contemplated, and
that the FCC granted the certificates routinely for a wide range of
communications properties.3 Moreover, Congress found that the
FCC had developed no standard for issuing the certificates and
that grants "frequently resulted in only transitory minority owner-
ship of broadcast properties"39 thus frustrating the stated goal of
encouraging minority ownership. 4° Congress also found that the
tax certificate policy was not subject to systematic review by the IRS
or any other governmental body to evaluate the cost to the gov-
ernment.41 At least one senator believed there was no showing of
"past (or current) discrimination" to justify the tax certificate pro-
gram. Senator Bob Packwood, in describing the tax certificate
program, posed the following question: "Do we want a Govern-
ment policy.., where there is no evidence of discrimination?'0 2 In
short, the tax certificate policy was eliminated because Congress
believed that its disadvantages vastly outweighed its benefits.43
3. Distress Sale Policy---In 1978, the FCC implemented the dis-
tress sale policy, which allowed a broadcast licensee whose license
had been designated for a revocation hearing to sell his station to a
minority-controlled entity at seventy-five percent or less of the sta-
tion's fair-market value. Underlying the distress sale policy was the
dearth of minority ownership. The FCC observed:
36. 1978 Policy Statement, supra note 21, at 980-81.
37. See Act of April 11, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-7, § 2, 109 Stat. 93, 93-94.
38. See S. REP. No. 104-16, at 17 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 89, 98.
39. Id.
40. See Greg Forster, Tax Breaks for Being Black, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1995, at A20. But see
William Kennard, General Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, Statement Be-
fore U.S. Senate Committee on Finance (Mar. 7, 1995) in 1995 WL 93492 (F.D.C.H.);
William Kennard, General Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, Statement Be-
fore U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee, Oversight of the Committee on Ways and
Means (Jan. 27, 1995) in 1995 WL 30799 (F.D.C.H.).
41. SeeS. REP. No. 104-16, supra note 38, at 17.
42. 141 CONG. REc. S4532, S4538 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1995) (statement of Senator
Packwood).
43. SeeS. REP. No. 104-16, supra note 38, at 17.
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Full minority participation in the ownership and management
of broadcast facilities results in a more diverse selection of
programming. In addition, an increase in ownership by mi-
norities will inevitably enhance the diversity of control of a
limited resource, the spectrum. And, of course, we have long
been committed to the concept of diversity of control because
diversification ... is a public good in a free society, and is ad-
ditionally desirable where a government licensing system
limits access by the public to the use of radio and television
facilities."*
The distress sale policy still exists but its constitutionality is in
question since Adarand. This uncertainty arises because the FCC
justified its distress sale policy principally on the ground that mi-
nority ownership would lead to a diversity of viewpoints. In
Adarand, the Supreme Court overruled the use of the intermediate
scrutiny standard of review in federal race-based affirmative action
programs. Intermediate scrutiny was used in Metro Broadcasting to
uphold the FCC's distress sale policy, which was based on viewpoint
diversity. Some commentators have suggested that the FCC modify
the distress sale policy to be race-neutral.45
4. Multiple Ownership Rules-Prior to the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, the FCC's national television ownership rules limited a
single owner to twelve stations with an aggregate national audience
of no more than twenty-five percent.4 A non-minority owner could
take a non-controlling interest in an additional two minority-
controlled stations, making for a TV ownership limit of fourteen
stations, if the aggregate audience of all its stations did not exceed
thirty percent. In contrast, a minority owner could acquire an addi-
tional two stations with an aggregate audience reach of up to thirty
percent and was allowed to have a controlling interest in those sta-
tions, making for a TV minority ownership limit of fourteen
stations. Diversity was a rationale for these ownership rules; the
FCC stated that "our national multiple ownership rules may, in
some circumstances, play a role in fostering minority ownership. 47
The 1996 Telecommunications Act eliminated the numerical
cap and raised the overall national television audience reach to
44. 1978 Policy Statement, supra note 21, at 981.
45. See, e.g., Michael E. Lewyn, The Case for Color-Blind Distress Sales, 19 HASTINGS COMM.
& EN -. LJ. 31 (1996) (advocating the idea that making the distress sale policy race-neutral
would allow it to survive a strict scrutiny review).
46. See47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e) (1) (ii)-(iii), (2), (3) (1995).
47. Report and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 74, 94 (adopted Dec. 19, 1984).
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thirty-five percent 8 The FCC subsequently amended its rules to
reflect the statutory change and effectively eliminated this differen-
tial treatment for minority-owned stations.49
Previously, the FCC's national radio ownership rules generally
limited commercial radio ownership on a nationwide basis to no
more than twenty AM stations and no more than twenty FM sta-
tions, but permitted minority-controlled licensees to own and
control twenty-five AM and twenty-five FM stations nationwide.50
The 1996 Telecommunications Act, however, directed the FCC to
eliminate these national ownership restrictions," including the mi-
nority-owner variation.52
B. Use of Affirmative Action Programs in
Wireless Spectrum-Based Services
1. Random Selection: Lotteries--In 1982, Congress enacted Sec-
tion 309(i) of the Communications Act to allow the FCC to select
licensees by random selection. 3 Section 309(i) also required the
FCC to establish incentives, rules, and procedures ensuring
"significant preferences" for minority-controlled applicants in
awarding licenses by lottery.5 4 The FCC used this section to award
wireless licenses for cellular, specialized mobile radio, and low-
power TV. As part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, Congress limited the use of random selections and in 1997
forbade them outright except for the award of licenses and permits
for public, noncommercial television stations.55
The legislative history of Section 309(i), however, evidences
Congress's awareness of the discrimination that affects minority
entrepreneurs in the communications industry.56 In addition to
relying on the diversity rational, Congress noted that "the effects of
past inequities stemming from racial and ethnic discrimination
48. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(c)(1)(B), 110
Stat. 56, 111.
49. See Implementation of Sections 202(c) (1) and 202(e) of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, 11 F.C.C.R_ 12374 (1996).
50. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e) (1) (i) (1995).
51. Local radio ownership restrictions remain under the new Act. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 153(b) (1996).
52. See Implementation of Sections 202(a) and 202(b) (1) of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 12368 (1996) (amending 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 to eliminate national
radio ownership rule as required by 1996 Act).
53. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(i) (Supp. III 1997).
54. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(i) (3) (A) (1994).
55. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 3002 (1) & (2), 111 Stat.
251 (1997).
56. SeeS. REP. No. 97-191 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2237, 2284-89.
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have resulted in a severe under-representation of minorities in the
media of mass communications, as it has adversely affected their
participation in other sectors of the economy as well. 57 Congress
concluded that adding race-based preferences to random selection
procedures would remedy "the past economic disadvantage to mi-
norities which has limited their entry into various sectors of the
economy, including the media of mass communications
Congress also observed that the preferences created in Section
309(i) were "narrowly-drawn" to promote diversity in mass com-
munications."
2. Auctions and Bidding Credits--Section 3090) allowed the
FCC to select licensees by auction. Section 309(0) (3) (B) instructed
the FCC to establish competitive bidding procedures that would
"promot[e] economic opportunity and competition and ensur[e]
that new and innovative technologies are readily accessible to the
American people ... disseminating licenses among ... businesses
owned by members of minority groups and women. "6° Again in Section
309(j) (4) (D), Congress required the FCC, in prescribing area des-
ignations and bandwidth assignments, to promote "economic
opportunity for a wide variety of applicants, including small busi-
nesses ... and businesses owned by members of minority groups and
women. ,6 In creating these opportunities, Section 309(j) (4) (C) (ii)
suggested that the FCC consider using "tax certificates, bidding
preferences, and other procedures."62 Before implementing this
provision, the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on
Minority Enterprise, Finance & Urban Development held hearings,
receiving testimony from several experts concerning the historical
exclusion that minorities face in trying to enter the telecommuni-
cations industry. 63 The House of Representatives acknowledged
that
unlike mass media licenses, where diversity in ownership
contributes to diversity of viewpoints, most of the licenses
issued pursuant to the bidding authority in section 309(j) will
be for services where the race or gender of the licensee will
57. Id. at 2287. But see H.R. CoNF. REPORT 97-765 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2261 (indicating that its intent in implementing Section 309(I)(3) (A) is the fostering of
diversity).
58. Id. at 2288.
59. Id.
60. 47 U.S.C. § 3090) (3) (B) (1994) (emphasis added).
61. 47 U.S.C. § 3090) (4) (C) (ii) (1994) (emphasis added).
62. 47 U.S.C. § 3090)(4)(D) (1994).
63. See H.R. RP. No. 103-885, at 237 (1994).
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not affect the delivery of service to the public. Nevertheless,
the Commission should adopt regulations pursuant to this
section to ensure that businesses owned by members of
minority groups and women are not in any way excluded from
the competitive bidding process.64
In implementing Section 3090) of the Communications Act, in
1994 the FCC promulgated rules6 that gave a twenty-five percent
"bidding credit" to minority-owned and women-owned businesses
that partook in auctions.6
The bidding credits involved in the auctions were challenged in
two cases. In Graceba Total Communications, Inc. v. FCC,67 the non-
minority complainant won two licenses to provide interactive video
data services, but argued that the bidding credits given to minority-
owned and women-owned businesses artificially inflated auction
prices and resulted in the complainant's discrimination; he de-
manded a twenty-five percent reduction in the price of its
licenses.68
While the complainant's petition was still pending, the Supreme
Court decided Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,69 holding that fed-
eral affirmative action programs are unconstitutional unless "they
are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling govern-
mental interests." 70 In Graceba, the D.C. Circuit Court did not rule
on the constitutionality of the program, but remanded the case to
the FCC because it was of the opinion that the resolution of many
71issues would benefit from the expertise of the agency.
These bidding rules came under challenge again in Omnipoint v.
FCC.2 A non-minority licensee challenged the constitutionality of
64. H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 255 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.CA.N. 378, 582.
65. For the entrepreneurs's block of the PCS auction, there were the following bene-
fits:(1) a female or minority-owned applicant could have a single passive non-voting investor
with an interest as large as 49.9% if the applicant held 50.1% interest; (2) a special excep-
tion that allowed an individual member of the control group of a minority-owned C block to
apply even though the individual's other business properties would otherwise make the
applicant too large for the entrepreneur's block; and (3) minority and female-owned busi-
nesses were to receive an additional fifteen percent bidding credit, tax certificates, and more
favorable installment payment plans than other businesses. See Fifth Report and Order, 9
F.C.C.R. 5532, 5581-82, 5589 (1994).
66. See Fourth Report and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 2330, 2336-39 (1994); 47 C.F.R.
§ 95.816(d)(1) (1996).
67. 115 F.3d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
68. See id.
69. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
70. See infra Part II.D for a more detailed discussion of Adarand.
71. See Graceba, 115 F.3d at 1038.
72. 78 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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the FCC's tiered bidding credits as violative of his equal protection
rights. The Court issued a stay of the FCC's PCS block auction on
the ground that the program did not meet the intermediate scru-
tiny standard. Shortly after this challenge was filed, the Supreme
Court decided Adarand. The FCC stayed the auction rule provi-
sions to evaluate them in light of Adarand. The FCC subsequently
released its Sixth Report and Order which eliminated the tiered bid-
ding credits for minorities and women and provided the same
bidding credits and installment payments to all small businesses.7 3
The D.C. Circuit Court held in Omnipoint that the FCC's actions in
eliminating gender and racial tier bidding credits were not arbi-
trary and capricious.74
C. Use of Affirmative Action Programs in Cable
Although the 1978 Policy Statement announced the minority tax
certificate initiative in the broadcast area, the FCC noted that it
"expected that in the future attention will also be directed to-
ward[s] improving minority participation in such services as cable
television .... 7 Indeed, in the years that followed the 1978 Policy
Statement, the FCC used the tax certificate and distress sale policies
to facilitate cable system sales to minority-owned entities.76
In the 1992 Cable Act, Congress required the FCC to prescribe
rules establishing "reasonable limits on the number of cable sub-
scribers a person is authorized to reach through cable systems
owned by such person."77 In 1993, the Commission adopted rules
implementing this statutory provision by imposing a horizontal
ownership limit prohibiting one entity from having an attributable
interest in cable systems that in the aggregate reach more than
thirty percent of the cable homes nationwide.7 8 To promote pro-
73. See 11 F.C.C.R. 136, 161 (1996)
74. See Omnipoint, 78 F.3d at 633.
75. 1978 Policy Statement, supra note 21, at 984.
76. See Policies and Rules Regarding Minority and Female Ownership of Mass Media
Facilities, 10 F.C.C.R. 2788, 2789 & nn.7 & 8 (1995); Policy Statement on Minority Owner-
ship of Cable Television Facilities, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1469, 1471 (1982) (expanding
Commission's tax certificate policy to include sales and exchanges of cable facilities in order
to encourage minority ownership of cable facilities).
77. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C.
§ 533(f)(1)(A) (1992).
78. See Implementation of Section 11 and 13 of the Cable Television Consumer Protec-
tion and Competition Act of 1992, 8 F.C.C.R. 8565, 8577 (1993). In response to Daniels
Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993), which held the statute uncon-
stitutional, the FCC stayed its rule in light of the court's ruling.
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gramming diversity as mandated by Congress, the FCC also
adopted a rule permitting cable systems to reach thirty-five percent
penetration, provided that the additional five percent are minority-
controlled.7 9 The FCC explained that this five-percent "minority
bubble" was a "significant means of fostering the inclusion of a di-
versity of views in cable," as well as "encouraging MSO investment
in minority-owned cable systems, which in turn will promote addi-
tional minority ownership of cable facilities and greater minority
participation in the selection of programming. "' °
The FCC also adopted channel occupancy rules for cable televi-
sion, referred to as "vertical integration," which included an
increased allowance for carrying channels in which the operator
has an attributable interest but that are minority-controlled.'
Section 612 of the 1934 Communications Act required cable sys-
tems to set aside a certain percentage of their channel capacity for
commercial "leased access" by unaffiliated entities. Section Nine
of the 1992 Cable Act amended this provision by adding a new sub-
section (i) which permits cable operators to "use any such channel
capacity for the provision of programming from a qualified minor-
ity programming source... whether or not such source is affiliated
with the cable operator." 83
The legislative history of the 1992 Cable Act indicates Congress
believed that the purpose of the leased access provision was to
promote diversity of program sources and to ensure access to a
wide variety of viewpoints. s The 1992 Cable Act House Report
states:
[I]ncreasing the availability of minority programming
sources ... would contribute greatly to the diversity of
programming available to cable viewers and will help to
assure the widest possible diversity of information services to
the public. New subsection 612(i) is intended to provide
cable operators increased incentives to carry minority
programming services and is consistent with FCC and
Congressional objectives designed to increase the diversity
79. See Implementation of Sections 11 and 13 of the Cable Act, 8 F.C.C.R. at 8758
(codified in 47 C.F.R. 76.503(b)).
80. Id. at 8578-79.
81. See id. at 8596.
82. See 47 U.S.C. § 532 (1992).
83. 47 U.S.C. § 532(i) (1) (1992). A qualified minority programming source is defined
as "a programming source which devotes substantially all of its programming to coverage of
minority viewpoints, or to programming directed at members of minority groups, and which
is over 50 percent minority-owned." 47 U.S.C. § 532(i) (2) (1992).
84. SeeS. REP No. 102-92 (1991); H.R. REP. No. 102-628, at 40 (1992).
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of viewpoints by encouraging minority ownership of the
communications media.
5
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION PROGRAMS
Historically, affirmative action programs could be categorized in
three ways: (1) programs designed to enhance diversity of voices
and First Amendment participation such as those recognized in
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC;8 6 (2) programs designed to encour-
age diversity to correct a racial or gender imbalance, for example,
the program allowed in Fullilove v. Klutznick;s7 and (3) programs
designed to remedy past discrimination-United States v. Paradis e
presents an example of such a program.
A. Diversity of Voices
1. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC-Under the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, the FCC was constitutionally permitted to
regulate broadcasters in an effort to foster diversity of viewpoints. 9
The FCC used the diversity-of-viewpoints rationale as a basis for
implementing programs to extend broadcast ownership opportuni-
ties to minority- and women-owned businesses. The FCC based its
regulations on the ground that more diverse ownership (in terms
of race and gender) would lead to more diverse perspectives.
Two of the FCC affirmative action rules were challenged in Metro
Broadcasting as discriminatory to white applicants. The challenged
policies involved (1) a program awarding an enhancement for mi-
nority ownership in comparative proceedings, and (2) the minority
"distress sale" program, which permits a limited category of exist-
ing radio and television broadcast stations to be transferred only to
minority-controlled firms.90 In Metro Broadcasting, the Court used an
85. H.R. REP. No. 102-628, at 122 (1992).
86. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
87. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
88. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
89. See generally FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978)
(upholding the then-FCC rules, which required the divestiture of either a newspaper or
broadcast station where they were owned by the same company in the same community
when each was the sole newspaper or sole broadcast station in the area).
90. See Metro Broad., 547 U.S. at 557.
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intermediate level of scrutiny to analyze the FCC's affirmative ac-
tion programs. The Court specifically held that
benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress-even
if those measures are not "remedial" in the sense of being de-
signed to compensate victims of past governmental or societal
discrimination-are constitutionally permissible to the extent
that they serve important governmental objectives within the
power of Congress and are substantially related to achieve-
ment of those objectives."
The Court noted that the FCC policies did not serve solely as a
remedy for past discrimination, 92 but concluded that they served an
"important governmental objective" of "enhancing broadcast di-
versity. "93 The Supreme Court determined that there may be
important differences between the broadcasting practices of mi-
nority owners and those of their non-minority counterparts. The
Court discussed evidence suggesting that an owner's minority
status "does appear to have specific impact on the presentation of
minority images in local news [in that] minority-owned stations
tend to devote more news time to topics of minority interest and to
avoid racial and ethnic stereotypes in portraying minorities."94 The
Court upheld the FCC's policies.
The Supreme Court in Adarand overruled the intermediate
standard of review used in Metro Broadcasting, thus requiring that
the FCC's affirmative action programs meet the strict scrutiny
91. Id. at 564-65.
92. See id. at 566.
93. Id. at 567. Similarly, in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978), Justice Powell stated that an affirmative action plan that took the racial diversity of
the students into account would be constitutionally permissible under certain circumstances.
See id. at 311-14. In his view, having a diverse student body would lead to a robust exchange
of ideas in the classroom. See id. In Bakke, a white student rejected by the University of Cali-
fornia Medical School sued alleging discrimination. Id. at 277. The University of California
used a quota system and reserved a certain number of seats for students of color. See id. at
275. The Supreme Court had a divided judgment with four justices willing to use a less strin-
gent standard of review for racial classifications "designed to further remedial purposes." Id.
at 359 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part). Four justices thought that the case should be affirmed on statutory
grounds. See id. at 411-12, 421 (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart, and Rehnquist,
2.). Justice Powell wrote the concurring opinion that provided the Court with a five-person
majority, explaining that "[riacial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect
and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination," but he considered diversity an
important governmental interest to uphold in higher education. Id. at 291. But see Hopwood
v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that race may not be used as a basis for school
admissions even to correct racial imbalance).
94. Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 581.
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standard. Because the Court did not decide whether diversity is a
compelling governmental interest under the strict scrutiny test,
there is some uncertainty concerning whether the FCC's programs
would be constitutional under this new test.
B. Diversity Designed to Correct Racial or Gender Imbalance
1. Fullilove v. Klutznick95-Fullilove presented a facial constitu-
tional challenge to a Public Works Employment Act requirement
that ten percent of federal funds granted for public works be set
aside for minority-owned businesses.96 The Act authorized a four
billion dollar appropriation for federal grants to state and local
governments for use in public works projects. 97 The primary pur-
pose of the Act was to provide a quick boost to the national
economy during the recession. 9 Fullilove failed to produce a ma-
jority opinion. Chief Justice Burger noted that although a
"program that employs racial or ethnic criteria ... calls for close
examination," the Court was at the same time "bound to approach
[its] task with appropriate deference to the Congress, a co-equal
branch charged by the Constitution with the power to 'provide for
the ... general Welfare of the United States' and 'to enforce, by
appropriate legislation,' the equal protection guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment."9 The ChiefJustice, in an opinion joined
by Justices White and Powell, observed that "[a]ny preference
based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most
searching examination to make sure that it does not conflict with
constitutional guarantees."' °° He employed a two-part test which
asked first, "whether the objectives of [the] legislation are within the
power of Congress," and second, whether the limited use of racial
and ethnic criteria, in the context presented, is a "constitutionally
permissible means for achieving the congressional objectives and
does not violate the equal protection component of the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fifth Amendment."'
Upholding the ten percent set-aside program, Chief Justice Bur-
ger wrote that because of its unique powers, "Congress not only
95. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
96. See id. at 453-54.
97. See id. at 453.
98. See id. at 457.
99. Id. at 472.
100. Id. at 491.
101. Id. at 473.
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may induce voluntary action to assure compliance with existing
federal statutory or constitutional antidiscrimination provisions,
but also, where Congress has authority to declare certain conduct
unlawful, it may, as here, authorize and induce state action to avoid
such conduct."'O°
C. Past Discrimination
1. United States v. Paradise °3-In 1972, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Middle District of Alabama found that the
Alabama Department of Public Safety had systematically excluded
blacks as state troopers and imposed a hiring quota requiring the
department to refrain from engaging in discrimination in its em-
ployment and promotion practices1 4 By 1979, no blacks had risen
to the upper ranks of the department.'OS In 1983, eleven years after
the district court's initial ruling, the department had failed to de-
velop promotion procedures that did not have an adverse impact
on blacks; as a consequence, the district court ordered that at least
fifty percent of those promoted must be black as long as qualified
black candidates were available.106 This quota would last until the
department implemented an acceptable promotion procedure.107
The Supreme Court found that there was a compelling govern-
mental interest for this quota because it was designed to remedy
past and present discrimination by the department' °e The Court
found that it was necessary to have the quota because blacks were
injured by the department's delay in developing an acceptable
promotion procedure and "that white troopers promoted since
102. Id. at 483-84. Justice Powell wrote separately to express his view that the plurality
opinion employed "strict judicial scrutiny." Id. at 496. Justice Stewart and then-Justice
Rehnquist dissented, arguing that the Constitution required the federal government to meet
the same strict standard as the states when enacting racial qualifications and that the pro-
gram before the Court failed that standard. See id. at 523.
103. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
104. See id. at 154.
105. See id. at 159.
106. See id. at 160, 163.
107. See id. at 163.
108. See id. at 167. In addition, the Court found that the quota was "narrowly tailored to
accomplish its purposes-to remedy past discrimination and eliminate its lingering effects."
Id. at 171. In determining whether the quota was narrowly tailored, the Court evaluated the
following factors: (1) the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies;
(2) the flexibility and duration of the relief, including the availability of waiver provisions;
(3) the relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant labor market; and (4) the impact
of the relief on the rights of third parties. See id.
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1972 were the specific beneficiaries of an official policy which
systematically excluded all blacks."'09 The Court found that the quota
was flexible because it could be waived if no qualified black candi-
dates were available, it applied only when the Department needed
to make promotions, and it endured only until the Department
developed a promotion procedure that did not have a discrimina-
tory impact on blacks."0 The fifty percent quota lasted only until
blacks composed twenty-five percent of upper ranks such as corpo-
ral or sergeant and was constitutionally permissible because it
addressed the department's delay in developing nondiscriminatory
promotion procedures."' The Court also found that the quota did
not impose an unacceptable burden on white applicants because it
was temporary and extremely limited, applying only to promotions
to corporal and not other upper ranks. Moreover, the burden im-
posed, like a hiring goal, was diffuse."
2
D. The Supreme Court Modifies Its Affirmative Action Jurisprudence
In Croson and Adarand, the Supreme Court elevated the standard
of review for all affirmative action programs to that of strict scru-
tiny. This standard of review makes it much harder for the
government to establish an affirmative action plan.
1. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 3 -The City of Rich-
mond adopted a minority business utilization plan '4 requiring
prime contractors awarded city construction contracts to subcon-
tract at least thirty percent of the dollar amount of each contract to
one or more minority business enterprises. Using the strict scrutiny
standard, the Supreme Court invalidated the city's plan. Racial
classifications are constitutional under this standard only if they:
109. Id. at 170 (citing Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F.2d 1514, 1533, n. 16 (1985)).
110. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 178.
111. Seeid. at 179, 185.
112. See id. at 182-83.
113. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
114. The plan defined "minority business enterprise" as "[a] business at least fifty-one
(51) percent of which is owned and controlled ... by minority group members." Id. at 478
(citing Richmond, Va., Ordinance No. 83-69-59 (Apr. 11, 1983), codified in RICHMOND, VA.,
CITY CODE § 12-156(a) (1985)). Minority group members were defined as "[c]itizens of the
United States who are Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts." Id.
There was "no geographic limit to the Plan; an otherwise qualified [minority business enter-
prise] from anywhere in the United States could avail itself of the [thirty percent] set-aside."
[VOL. 33:1&2
FALL 1999-WINTER 2000]
(1) further a compelling governmental interest; and (2) are
narrowly tailored.
The Court distinguished the facts of Croson from Fullilove. The
Court stated that Congress, unlike any state or political subdivision,
has the specific constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of
the Fourteenth Amendment."5 The power to "'enforce' may at
times also include the power to define situations which Congress
determines threaten principles of equality and to adopt prophylac-
tic rules to deal with those situations.""6 The Court noted that just
because "Congress may identify and redress the effects of society-
wide discrimination does not mean that, a fortiori, the States and
their political subdivisions are free to decide that such remedies
are appropriate."" 7 The Court stated: "To hold otherwise would be
to cede control ... to the 50 state legislatures ... and insulate any
[state] racial classification from judicial scrutiny....""'
The Court found that there was no compelling governmental in-
terest because the City of Richmond presented only generalized
assertions of past discrimination. To establish a compelling gov-
ernmental interest, there needed to be a prima facie showing of
prior or present discrimination. The discrimination could either
be by the governmental actor or by its "passive complicity" in the
discrimination of others. The Court reasoned that "any public en-
tity, state or federal, has a compelling interest in assuring that
public dollars, drawn from the tax [dollars] of all citizens, do not
serve to finance the evil of private prejudice." 9 However, the dis-
crimination had to be more than a mere allegation of societal
discrimination. A gross statistical disparity between utilized minor-
ity business enterprises and those available may constitute an
inference of a pattern or practice of discrimination. 20
The Court noted that it was almost impossible to assess whether
the City of Richmond's affirmative action plan was narrowly
tailored because it was not linked to identified discrimination in
any way. Nonetheless, the Court observed that there did not
appear to be any consideration of the use of race-neutral means to
increase minority business participation in city contracting. The
Court noted that many of the barriers to minority participation
(for example, lack of capital or failure to meet bonding
requirements) relied on by the city appeared to be race-neutral.
115. See id. at 487-88.
116. Id. at 490 (citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966)).
117. Id. at 490.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 492.
120. See id. at 503.
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The Court suggested "a race-neutral program of city financing for
small firms would, a fortiori, lead to greater minority
participation."'' The Court also criticized the thirty percent quota
as overly rigid and unrealistic because it assumed that minorities
would choose a particular trade in "lockstep proportion to their
representation in the local population."02 In addition, under the
plan there was no inquiry whether the particular minority business
receiving the preference suffered from the effects of past
discrimination by the city or prime contractors.'23 The Court also
noted that "a successful black, Hispanic, or Oriental entrepreneur
from anywhere in the country enjoys an absolute preference over other
citizens based solely on their race."' 24
2. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena' 2 -- In Adarand, the Su-
preme Court extended the Croson strict scrutiny standard of
review to federal affirmative action programs.' Therefore, all ra-
cial classifications (regardless of whether they are instituted by a
federal, state, or local government and regardless of whether they
are instituted for a malevolent or a benign purpose) must be ana-
lyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.127  Such
classifications are constitutional only if they: (1) further a compel-
ling governmental interest; and (2) are narrowly tailored.
3. The Supreme Court's Rationale for Adarand: The Search for
Congruence--The Adarand Court sought to find "congruence" be-
tween all standards of review that the Court had previously employed
for race-based legislation or regulations. The Court sought
"congruence" because, even if the law was designed with the best of
intentions, the Supreme Court believed that voluntary race-based
121. See id. at 507.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 508.
124. Id. (emphasis added).
125. 515 U.S. 200, 205 (1995). Petitioner Adarand Constructors, Inc. claimed that the
federal government's practice of giving general contractors on government projects a finan-
cial incentive to hire subcontractors controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals," and in particular the government's use of race-based presumptions in identify-
ing such individuals violated the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. See id.
126. FourJustices-Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer, and Stevens-dissented. These dissenting
justices would have upheld the Adarand affirmative action program and would have em-
ployed an intermediate level of scrutiny for government-sanctioned affirmative action
programs similar to those in question in Adarand. Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred in
the decision, but evinced an abhorrence for affirmative action programs of any kind. Even
in the case of past discrimination, Justice Scalia would limit a remedy only to those who
could show that they were actually discriminated against.
127. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
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affirmative action plans tended to stereotype and stigmatize their
beneficiaries.
Historically, the Court had employed an intermediate standard of
review for those cases that involved affirmative action plans spon-
sored by the federal government.' 28 In Fullilove, the Court upheld
Congress's inclusion of a ten percent set-aside for minority-owned
businesses. The Court called its test a "searching examination."'
29
The Court employed a two-part test which asked first "whether the
objectives of this legislation are within the power of Congress," and
second, "whether the limited use of racial and ethnic criteria, in the
context presented, is a constitutionally permissible means for achiev-
ing the congressional objectives."" 0 The rationale for this lowered
standard was that Section Five'31of the Fourteenth Amendment '12 to
the Constitution empowers Congress to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment by appropriate legislation.
In Adarand, the Court held that "to the extent (if any) that Ful-
lilove held federal racial classifications to be subject to a less
rigorous standard, it is no longer controlling."'33 But the Court re-
served judgment on whether the program upheld in Fullilovewould
survive strict scrutiny.
The Court also overruled the intermediate standard of review
used in Metro Broadcasting.'33 The Court stated that to the extent
Metro Broadcasting was inconsistent with Adarand's holding, it was
overruled.'3 The Court reasoned that Metro Broadcasting departed
from prior cases in two respects: first, it turned its back on Croson's
explanation as to why strict scrutiny of all government racial
classifications is essential; 7 and second, Metro Broadcasting rejected
128. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
129. Id. at 491.
130. Id. at 473.
131. Section Five specifically provides: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
132. The Fourteenth Amendment otherwise provides that
[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immu-
nities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its ju-
risdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id. at § 1.
133. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995).
134. See id.
135. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
136. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
137. In Croson, the court stated:
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congruence between the standards applicable to federal and state
racial classifications. In addition Adarand stated that Metro
Broadcasting undermined two other constitutional standards-
"skepticism of all racial classifications and consistency of treatment
irrespective of the race of the burdened or benefited group."1
Justice O'Connor's Adarand opinion attempted to dispel the ear-
lier notion that strict scrutiny is "strict in theory but fatal in fact."'39
She noted that race discrimination still occurs, and continued
"[t]he unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering
effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this
country is an unfortunate reality, and government is not disquali-
fied from acting in response to it." "
She also noted that "[w]hen race-based action is necessary to
further a compelling interest, such action is within constitutional
constraints if it satisfies the 'narrow tailoring' test this Court has set
out in previous cases." 41 Justice O'Connor supported the constitu-
tionality of race-based remedies in eliminating discrimination by
citing to Paradise.
42
The Court remanded Adarand for further consideration of the
principles it announced in the opinion. The Court noted that the
court of appeals "did not decide the question whether the interests
served by the use of subcontractor compensation clauses are prop-
erly described as 'compelling.' , 43 The court of appeals also did not
address the issue of narrow tailoring in terms of strict scrutiny
cases, by asking, for example, whether there was any consideration
of the use of race-neutral means to increase minority business par-
ticipation or whether the program was appropriately limited so
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based measures,
there is simply no way of determining what classifications are "benign" or "remedial"
and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferior-
ity or simple racial politics. Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out"
illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal impor-
tant enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. The test also ensures that the
means chosen "fit" this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility
that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.
City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
138. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226-27.
139. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall,J., concurring).
140. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237.
141. Id.
142. See id. (citing United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987)).
143. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237.
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that it "will not last longer than the discriminatory effects it is de-
signed to eliminate."0
44
E. Adarand on Remand
1. Strict Scrutiny-On remand, the district court's decision was
the first case analyzing a federal affirmative action program under
strict scrutiny. The district court granted Adarand's motion for
summary judgment and denied that of the defendants.145 The court
also issued an injunction enjoining the defendants from adminis-
tering, enforcing, soliciting bids for, or allocating any funds under
the programs.'4 The injunction effectively precluded the imple-
mentation of statutes and regulations that grant presumptive
eligibility for government preference in contracting on the basis of
race.
The district court stated that the Supreme Court "did not give
any meaning to the phrase 'compelling interest' either by defini-
tion or illustration." The court also noted that there appeared to
be "only one compelling interest recognized by the Supreme Court
to justify racial classifications, namely remedying past wrongs.
"
1
4
1
144. Id. at 238 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 513 (1980) (Powell,J. con-
curring)).
145. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 965 F. Supp. 1556 (D. Colo. 1997), vacated
on appeal sub nom. Adarand v. Slater, 169 F.3d 1292, 1295 (10th Cir. 1999). On remand, the
district court judge chided the Supreme Court for remanding the case without giving the
lower court more direction. Senior District CourtJudge Kane stated:
The prudence of remanding this case to the trial court is difficult to perceive. Both
parties have stipulated to the absence of any dispute of material fact ... and the
"unresolved questions" posed by Justice O'Connor ... concern only issues of statutory
construction relating to "the details of the complex regulatory regimes" and a num-
ber of "apparent discrepanc[ies]" the Court found in the application of the statutes
and regulations involved.
Id. at 1558.
The district court further noted that the decision to require strict scrutiny "alters the play-
ing field in some important respects." Id. (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 237 (1995)). The district court was of the opinion that "it is equally true that the
higher courts are better equipped to decide as a matter of law whether, under the proper
interpretation, the statutes involved can be described as in furtherance of a compelling
interest and narrowly tailored to meet that interest." Id.
146. Id. at 1584.
147. See id. at 1570 (citing City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)
(plurality opinion)) ("'[u] nless [racial classifications] are strictly reserved for remedial set-
tings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial
hostility.'"). "However, '[s] ocietal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for
imposing a racially classified remedy.'" Id. (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 497).
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2. Congress's Power to Legislate National Problems--The district
court noted that the Supreme Court's Adarand opinion also lacked
clarity as to Congress's role in legislating solutions to national
problems. The parties differed on Congress's power to legislate
regarding the national problem of discrimination. The plaintiff
argued that Congress needed to make particularized findings of
discrimination in Colorado, whereas the defendant believed that
Congress could make national legislation for national problems.
The district court stated that
[t]he diametric arguments of the parties concerning what
constitutes a compelling governmental interest for Congress
and the evidence required to establish such interest, are not
surprising. They reflect the majority's failure in Adarand III to
define the parameters of Congress' powers under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment "to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions of this article."'"
The district court noted that the Supreme Court sidestepped the
issue of Congress's acknowledged unique Section Five powers be-
cause addressing it would have opened a Pandora's box and this
discussion would have significantly weakened the notion of con-
gruence. As a result, the district court believed that Justice
O'Connor's assertion in Croson that Congress has the ability under
Section Five to recognize and address racial discrimination was
undisturbed.
Despite the uncertainty of whether courts should defer to Con-
gress's Section Five authority, the Adarand district court held that
Congress did not need to make particularized findings of discrimi-
nation in the highway industry in Colorado:
149
148. Id. at 1572 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5).
149. Id. The district court cited for authority two statements from Justice O'Connor in
Croson, in which she stated that other government entities might have to show more than
Congress before undertaking race-conscious measures: "The degree of specificity required
in the findings of discrimination and the breadth of the discretion in the choice of remedies
may vary with the nature and authority of the governmental body." Id. (citing Croson, 488
U.S. at 489 (citations omitted).
The Adarand district court also relied on Oregon v. Mitchell 400 U.S. 112 (1970), in which
the Court recognized Congress's authority to legislate nationwide remedies for nationwide
problems. Mitchell held that when Congress deemed certain circumstances were national
problems, Congress could apply federal law. See id. at 133-34. In Mitchel the congressional
enactment prohibited the use of literacy tests. This legislation was designed to be a protec-
tive barrier preventing racial harm, namely the exclusion of African Americans from voting.
The Adarand district court noted that the racial classifications in Adarand were distin-
guishable from the racial classifications in Mitchell the Adarand statute was designed to
indirectly lower racial barriers by using financial incentives to encourage prime contractors
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[T]he requisite particularized findings of discrimination to
support a compelling governmental interest for Congress' ac-
tion in implementing the [program] under a strict scrutiny
standard of review would include findings of discriminatory
barriers facing [disadvantaged businesses] in federal con-
struction contracting nationwide, rather than in a single state,
whether such actions were as a result of intentional acts of the
federal government or "passive complicity in the acts of discrimi-
nation by the private sector."'50
The Adarand district court held that nothing in Adarand (or any
other Supreme Court decision) required a court to ignore Con-
gress's ability to address nationwide problems even under a strict
scrutiny standard of review. 5' The district court noted that a court
that did otherwise would be placing Congress "on the same consti-
tutional plane as a city council.'
52
F. Issues Unresolved by the Adarand Decisions
1. Is Diversity Ever a Compelling State Interest?-
a. Adarand Supreme Court Decision-The Supreme Court
clearly indicated that past discrimination would be a compelling
state interest for an affirmative action plan. But the Court, through
two omissions in its discussion, left open the question whether
there is any other basis for establishing an affirmative action plan,
namely non-remedial objectives such as diversity. First, the Adarand
Court, in overruling the intermediate scrutiny standard of review
used in Metro Broadcasting, failed to discuss whether the diversity
rationale of Metro Broadcasting was still permissible. This omission
may not be a harbinger of the Court's acceptance of the diversity
rationale, because Justice O'Connor (who authored the Adarand
majority opinion) vigorously dissented in Metro Broadcasting, stating
that the diversity rationale for the FCC's affirmative action pro-
grams would be unconstitutional under either an intermediate or a
to hire subcontractor firms owned by members of minority groups. In contrast, the Mitchell
statute directly prohibited the use of racial barriers at their source by proscribing the use of
literacy tests. Nonetheless, the Adarand district court held that Congress need only make
national findings of past discrimination. See Adarand, 965 F. Supp. at 1573.
150. Id. at 1573 (emphasis added) (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 519).
151. Seeid.
152. Id.
153. SeeAdarand Contractors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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strict scrutiny standard of review. "4 In Croson, for example, Justice
O'Connor stated that affirmative action must be "strictly reserved
for remedial settings,"'55 yet in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education'56
she agreed with Justice Powell's view in Regents of University of Cali-
fornia v. Bakke57 that fostering racial and ethnic diversity in higher
education is a compelling interest. Adarand gave the Supreme
Court the opportunity to criticize the diversity rationale, but it did
not. Why not? Possibly because the issue of diversity as a compel-
ling state interest was not before the Court. It is possible that
Justice O'Connor's five to four Adarand majority was tenuous, and
would not withstand an attack on the diversity rationale.
Second, the Supreme Court overruled the standard of review
used by several of its prior precedents, namely Fullilove and Metro
Broadcasting, but the Court did not criticize the diversity rationale
articulated by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in Bakke.
Justice Powell's concurring opinion gave the court a five to four
majority in overturning the affirmative action plan for student ad-
missions at the Medical School of the University of California at
Davis, yet a five to four majority favored affirmative action plans in
some circumstances. In his opinion, Justice Powell stated that an
affirmative action plan that took the diversity of the students into
account would be constitutionally permissible.as In his view, having
a diverse student body would lead to a robust exchange of ideas in
the classroom.
By not specifically overruling the diversity rationale for affirma-
tive action programs that were evident in at least two past Supreme
Court opinions, yet specifically overruling the standard of review
used in Metro Broadcasting, the Court left open the possibility that
diversity-at least in some manifestation-might still be a sufficient
ground for an affirmative action program.
b. Lower Court Federal Court Decisions: Post-Adarand-Although
the U.S. Supreme Court has not provided much guidance on
whether diversity is still an acceptable compelling governmental
interest for affirmative action programs, several circuits have ren-
dered opinions on this issue. The Fifth and D.C. Circuits have held
that only past discrimination is a compelling governmental interest
154. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602-31 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing).
155. City of Richmond v.JA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
156. 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986).
157. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). The Adarand Court said that there was no opinion of the
Court in Bakke. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 218. But see Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 942 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996) (discussed infra Part II.F.2.a).
158. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12.
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under Adarand."9 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit has upheld the
constitutionality of giving employment preferences to minorities in
certain circumstances other than remedying past discrimination. 0
2. Diversity Versus Past Discrimination-Several lower courts, in
addition to the Adarand district court,' 6' have taken a very narrow
and limited view of what constitutes a compelling governmental
interest.
a. Fifth Circuit--In Hopwood v. Texas,62 several white students
who were denied admission to the University of Texas School of
Law sued alleging discrimination. The Fifth Circuit struck down as
unconstitutional the affirmative action admissions program for
blacks and Mexican Americans established by the University of
Texas School of Law. In a very narrow reading of Adarand and Cro-
son, the Fifth Circuit held that "non-remedial state interests will
neverjustify racial classification."' 63 It concluded that the classifica-
tion of persons on the basis of race for purposes of diversity
frustrates, rather than facilitates, equal protection goals. The Fifth
Circuit believed that Metro Broadcasting-was not binding precedent
because the case applied an intermediate scrutiny standard over-
ruled in Adarand. The court summarized its reading of precedent
by concluding that "there has been no indication from the Su-
preme Court, other than Justice Powell's lonely opinion in Bakke,
that the state's interest in diversity constitutes a compelling justifi-
cation for governmental race-based discrimination."' 6
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the University of Texas School
of Law had failed to show a compelling state interest in remedying
the present effects of past discrimination sufficient to maintain the
use of race in its admissions system.
b. D.C. Circuit-In Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC,'66 the
church, as holder of licenses for two radio stations, appealed an
159. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d 932 (1996); Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141
F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
160. SeeWittmner v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1111 (1997).
161. SeeAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 965 F. Supp. 1556 (D. Colo. 1997), vacated
on appeal sub nom. Adarand v. Slater, 169 F.3d 1292, 1295 (10th Cir. 1999).
162. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
163. Id. at 944 (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 945.
165. See id. at 955; see also Police Ass'n v. City of New Orleans, 100 F.3d 1159, 1168-69
(5th Cir. 1996) (reaffirming the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hopwood by rejecting the city's
racial diversity rationale and holding that an affirmative action program must be narrowly
tailored to remedy specific evidence of past discrimination; because the city produced no
evidence that its affirmative action program was designed to remedy "past discrimination,"
the Fifth Circuit found it unconstitutional).
166. 141 F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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order of the FCC that found that the church violated the FCC's
equal employment opportunity regulations through the use of re-
ligious hiring preferences and inadequate minority recruiting. The
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that (1) the church had stand-
ing to raise an equal protection challenge to the equal
employment opportunity program; (2) the equal employment op-
portunity regulations were subject to strict scrutiny review; and (3)
the FCC's stated justification for these regulations, such as foster-
ing "diverse" programming content, did not rise to the level of a
"compelling" governmental interest. 6 7 As a consequence, the court
held that the regulations violated equal protection and were un-
constitutional. '6
c. Seventh Circuit--In Wittmer v. Peters,'69 white correctional of-
ficers were unsuccessful in their application for lieutenants'
positions in a "boot camp" for young criminals. They brought suit
alleging that the state's affirmative action program, through which
one black correctional officer was promoted to lieutenant, violated
the whites' equal protection rights. The state argued that a black
lieutenant was needed because the black inmates, who constituted
sixty-eight percent of the boot camp population, would be "unlikely
to play the correctional game of brutal drill sergeant and brutal-
ized recruit" if black officers were not in authority at the camp.70
The state presented expert evidence that the camp would not suc-
ceed in its mission of "pacification and reformation" of young
criminals if a black male had not been appointed to one of the
lieutenant slots.1
7
'
In a decision written by Chief Judge Posner, the court observed
that the Supreme Court has held that discrimination in favor of a
minority group is sometimes permissible to rectify past discrimina-
tion against that group, but has not yet resolved whether there are
any permissible bases other than a remedial one that will withstand
"strict scrutiny. 012 The Seventh Circuit stated that it is clear, how-
ever, that no race-conscious allocation of burdens or benefits can
survive strict scrutiny unless
167. See id. at 350-55.
168. See id. at 356. The court also noted "[w]e doubt ... that the Constitution permits
the government to take account of racially based differences, much less encourage them.
One might well think such approach antithetical to our democracy .... Indeed, it's danger
is poignantly illustrated by this case." Id. at 355.
169. 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996).
170. Id. at 920 (emphasis added).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 918 (emphasis added).
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the defendants show that they are motivated by a truly power-
ful and worthy concern and that the racial measure that they
have adopted is a plainly apt response to that concern. They
must show that they had to do something and had no alterna-
tive to what they did. The concern and the response,
moreover, must be substantiated and not merely asserted.
1 73
The Seventh Circuit concluded that "rectification of past dis-
crimination is not the only setting in which government officials
can lawfully take race into account in making decisions," and ob-
served that other cases have singled out law-enforcement and
correctional settings as the clearest cases in which departures from
race neutrality may be permissible. 74 The Court upheld the race-
conscious hiring and concluded that the state had presented
ample evidence that its boot camp correctional program simply
would not succeed without an additional black lieutenant. The
race-conscious program upheld in this case was limited to the hir-
ing of a single officer-a very targeted and limited response to the
specific operational problem identified by the state.175
3. Diversity Conclusion-The Supreme Court left a very small
door open concerning whether diversity could ever be a compel-
ling governmental interest. It would be prudent for the FCC in
devising a race-based affirmative action program not to rely solely
on diversity, especially considering that Justice O'Connor has
clearly indicated her disapproval in her Metro Broadcasting dissent.
She may rule against any FCC race-based program relying solely on
diversity as its compelling governmental interest.
Since Adarand, very few circuit courts have dealt with the issue of
whether diversity is a compelling governmental interest for the
purposes of establishing an affirmative action program. In
Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit took a hard line and stated that past dis-
crimination is the only constitutionally sufficient compelling
governmental interest in establishing an affirmative action pro-
gram. In addition, in Lutheran Church, the D.C. Circuit held that
only past discrimination was a compelling governmental interest.
In contrast, in Wittmer, the Seventh Circuit allowed diversity to be a
compelling governmental interest. However, Wittmer is factually
distinguishable because it involves a criminal justice setting, which
173. Id.
174. Id.at919.
175. See id. at 921; see also Erwin v. Daley, 92 F.3d 521, 528 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Wittmer
for the proposition that rectification of past discrimination is not the sole basis upon which
government officials can lawfully take race into account in making decisions).
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at least one Supreme Court justice, who opposes affirmative action
programs, was of the opinion7 6 would be a permissible arena for
some race-conscious governmental action.
III. IF PAST DISCRIMINATION IS THE ONLY PERMISSIBLE
COMPELLING GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST, WHAT HAS
TO BE ESTABLISHED ON THE FEDERAL LEVEL?
A. The Adarand and Croson Supreme Court Decisions
Adarand did not clearly state what would have to be established
to show past discrimination on the national level. The most impor-
tant case showing what must be demonstrated to establish past
discrimination is City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.,1 77 but that case
dealt with the affirmative action plan of a city as opposed to one
developed by an independent agency of the federal government.
The Croson Court was particularly concerned that there were in-
sufficient findings of past discrimination in the City of Richmond
as opposed to the rest of the country. The Croson Court was also
concerned that the statistical evidence used by the City of Rich-
mond to establish discrimination was too broad. It compared the
number of minority-owned firms that were awarded contracts to
the percentage of minorities in the City of Richmond's population.
The Court held that constitutionally permissible statistical evidence
of discrimination would compare those minority-owned firms that
were utilized by the City of Richmond as compared to those that
were available in the City of Richmond to perform that type of
work.
Justice O'Connor suggested in Adarand that the "past dis-
crimination" need not be caused directly by the government actor.
She stated that government is not disqualified from acting in
response to the practice and "lingering effects" of racial
discrimination against minority groups.18 She cited Paradise as an
example of a "compelling interest" to remedy discrimination; but
176. See City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (stating that "only a social emergency rising to the level of imminent danger to life
and limb-for example, a prison race riot, requiring temporary segregation of inmates" can
justify a deviation from our color-blind Constitution).
177. See id. passim This is the most important case on this topic because it is the only af-
firmative action case decided by the Supreme Court indicating how a government entity may
make a claim for past discrimination.
178. SeeAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995).
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Paradise involved pervasive and blatant discrimination by the State
of Alabama.7 9
The Adarand decision does not tell us how these unanswered
questions play out on the federal level. Specifically, can the FCC
make national findings as opposed to specific geographical ones?
What constitutes past discrimination?
B. Lower Court Decisions-Post-Adarand
In Adarand on remand, the district court judge stated that the
"past discrimination" necessary for establishing a compelling gov-
ernmental interest could include passive complicity by the
government actor in discrimination by the private sector. The
judge, in fact, found that there was a compelling government in-
terest present. The examples cited by the district court judge were
"deficiencies in working capital, inability to meet bonding re-
quirements, disabilities caused by an inadequate 'track record,'
lack of awareness of bidding opportunities, unfamiliarity with bid-
ding procedures, preselection before the formal advertising
process, and the exercise of discretion by government procure-
ment officers to disfavor minority businesses."
80
1. What Constitutes Past Discrimination ?-
a. Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits: "Passive Participation in
System of Racial Exclusion"--In Contractors Association of Eastern
Pennsylvania v. Philadelphia,' the Third Circuit found
unconstitutional the provisions of a Philadelphia ordinance
creating a set-aside for black subcontractors on city public works
contracts. The court stated that the city could have taken steps to
remedy past discrimination by prime contractors against black
subcontractors if the city was a "'passive participant' in a system of
racial exclusion."8 2 The Third Circuit stated that, to constitute
"passive complicity," the city had to play a "role" in private
179. See id.
180. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 965 F. Supp. 1556, 1576 (D. Colo. 1997), va-
cated on appeal sub nom. Adarand v. Slater, 169 F.3d 1292, 1295 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (quoting U.S. Commission on Civil Rights,
"Minorities and Women as Government Contractors," 16-28, 86-88 (1975))). The district
court did not fully articulate its grounds for holding that the government's affirmative action
program was remedying past discrimination by the private sector.
181. 91 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1113 (1997).
182. Id. at 599 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 492) (finding insufficient evidence of dis-
crimination was presented).
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discrimination.13 The court also suggested that the city could
remedy discrimination by a local trade association if the city had
"passively participated" in the private discrimination.'1 4
In contrast, the Tenth Circuit stated in Concrete Works of Colorado
v. City of Denver that, "[a]lthough we do not read Croson as requir-
ing the municipality to identify an exact linkage between its award
of public contracts and private discrimination, such evidence
would at least enhance the municipality's factual predicate for a
race- and gender-conscious program."1 5 Similarly, the Ninth Cir-
cuit stated in Coral Const. Co. v. King County that "[m] ere infusion
of tax dollars into a discriminatory industry may be sufficient gov-
ernmental involvement" to constitute "passive complicity."8 6
b. Fifth Circuit: Past Discrimination by Specific Governmental
Actor-In Hopwood v. Texas,8 7 the Fifth Circuit narrowed the notion
of "past discrimination" that is needed to establish an affirmative
action program. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred
in allowing the discrimination by the public educational institu-
tions in the State of Texas to constitute the "past discrimination"
necessary in establishing an affirmative action program."4 The
court concluded that even a showing of "past discrimination" by
the University of Texas was inappropriate because the law school
operated separately within the system-maintaining its own admis-
sions program and hiring its own faculty.' 9 For the law school to
establish an affirmative action program in admissions, it had to
show that it was designed to address "past wrongs at that school." '9°
Although the record contained allegations of discrimination by the
Texas educational school system, the court looked upon the issue
183. See id.
184. See id. The court also held that the city did not "passively participate" in such dis-
crimination because it did not award contracts through trade association membership. The
court found it unnecessary to decide whether the city's statistical evidence provided a strong
basis of discrimination because it found that the set-aside was not "narrowly tailored." See id.
at 602, 605.
185. Concrete Works of Colo. v. City of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1994).
186. Coral Const. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 916 (9th Cir. 1991).
187. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
188. See id. at 954.
189. See id. at 951.
190. See id. at 952. In addition, the court found the evidence presented by the law
school of its "bad reputation" in the minority communities and its perception as "hostile" as
insufficient "present effects of past discrimination" so as to justify the affirmative action
program. The court held this opinion because the "bad reputation" and "hostile" environ-
ment could not be traced to actions of the law school. In addition, the law school's actual
past discriminatory actions were too remote in time, having ended in the 1960s. Because the
court found the admissions policy failed the "compelling interest" prong of the strict scru-
tiny test, it concluded that it did not have to examine whether it was "narrowly tailored" to
advance the government's interest. Id. at 953, 955.
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of past discrimination very narrowly and would only consider dis-
crimination by the specific governmental actor-the University of
Texas School of Law-to satisfy the compelling governmental in-
terest requirement.
2. Conclusion: Past Discrimination for Race-Based Affirmative Ac-
tion Plans-The FCC can adopt race-based affirmative action
programs based on passive complicity in the discrimination of oth-
ers. Courts either have suggested in dicta or have held that "passive
complicity" in another's discrimination would constitute a compel-
ling governmental interest. These cases have involved affirmative
action plans dealing with commerce or business, for example con-
struction contracts.
The Fifth Circuit in Hopwood limited the notion of "past dis-
crimination" that would satisfy a compelling governmental interest
to that of the specific governmental actor. But the Hopwood deci-
sion is contrary to the Supreme Court's pronouncements in both
Croson and Adarand in which the Court indicated a willingness to
consider "passive complicity" by the government actor in the dis-
crimination as a compelling governmental interest. The Fifth
Circuit said that it limited the "past discrimination" to the law
school because "when one state actor begins to justify racial prefer-
ences based upon the actions of other state agencies, the remedial
actor's competence to determine the existence and scope of the
harm-and the appropriate reach of the remedy-is called into
question."' 9'
The Hopwood court went on to say
[e]ven if, arguendo, the state [not the law school] is the proper
government unit to scrutinize, the law school's admissions
program would [still] not withstand [the court's] review. For
the admissions [process] to pass constitutional [review], the
State of Texas, through its legislature, would have to find that
past segregation has present effects; it would have to deter-
mine the magnitude of those present effects; and it would
need to limit carefully the "plus" given to applicants to rem-
edy that harm.'92
Hopwood can be distinguished from cases involving contractors.
In Hopwood, the law school played no role in the discrimination
that occurred in its feeder pool of schools-colleges and universi-
ties, secondary and elementary schools. In contrast, in the case of
191. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 951 (5th Cir. 1996).
192. Id.
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contractors, the government may be involved indirectly in the dis-
crimination by the private sector because the government is paying
public money to contractors who select subcontractors. In the case
of the FCC, private parties sell or transfer FCC licenses, and the
agency analyzes, approves, or disapproves the transaction. Dis-
crimination in the sale or transfer process may provide complicity
by the governmental agency which approved the deal and estab-
lished the broad procedures for the transaction.
The FCC can develop an affirmative action plan based on
"passive complicity" in the discrimination by others. Any affirma-
tive action plan developed for minority-owned businesses would
presumably attempt to remedy discrimination by the capital mar-
kets, advertisers, suppliers, brokers, other FCC licensees, and
customers of minority-owned or women-owned broadcasters. Un-
like the Hopwood affirmative action plan, any FCC plan would not
be attempting to remedy the discrimination by another govern-
mental agency. As such, any FCC plan and any FCC investigation
into "past discrimination" can examine discrimination by other
actors in the telecommunications market.
3. What Type of Statistical Evidence Needs to Be Presented ?-For a
race-based affirmative action program to be upheld, there has to
be a "strong basis in evidence" to support the conclusion that re-
medial action is necessary.193 A government can 'Justify affirmative
action by demonstrating 'gross statistical disparities' between the
proportion of minorities hired ... and the proportion of minori-
ties willing and able to do the work."'" "Anecdotal evidence may
also be used to document discrimination, especially if buttressed by
relevant statistical evidence." 95 Utilization ratios of eighty percent
or greater, which are close to full minority participation, are not,
standing alone, considered an indication of discrimination.'
96
Other factors need to be held constant when making the statisti-
cal analysis. For instance, in Engineering Contractors Association v.
Metropolitan Dade County, the Eleventh Circuit held that the statisti-
cal evidence presented by the county was insufficient to justify the
race-, ethnicity-, and gender-based affirmative action plans because
the statistical disparities could be explained without reference to
193. See City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989) (quoting Wygant
v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986)).
194. Ensley Branch NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548, 1565 (11th Cir. 1994).
195. Id.
196. See Engineering Contractors Ass'n v. Metropolitan Dade County, 122 F.3d 895, 914
(I1th Cir. 1997) (citing as analogous authority EEOC disparate impact guidelines, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.4D).
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discriminatory practices. 19 7 The court said that the statistical dispar-
ity in contract dollars could be explained by the fact that minority-
and woman-owned firms tend to be smaller, and as such won
smaller contracts. 9" While the court did not discount the anecdotal
evidence of discrimination, it held that such discrimination alone
could not prove discriminatory practices.'"
IV. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS FOR WOMEN
Government statutes and regulations that discriminate against
women have been historically scrutinized by courts under an
intermediate standard of review.2° Under this standard of review, a
court will find these statutes or regulations constitutionally valid if
they are substantially related to an important governmental
interest.20 1
A. Sixth Circuit-Strict Scrutiny for Gender-Based
Affirmative Action Programs
The Sixth Circuit has held that all government affirmative action
programs-whether race or gender based-are to be evaluated
under the strict scrutiny standard of review. 2 Gender-based af-
firmative action programs in the Sixth Circuit have to serve a
compelling governmental interest and have to be narrowly tailored
to withstand judicial review.2°3 These opinions are of questionable
197. See id. at 924.
198. See id. at 916-17.
199. See id. at 924-26.
200. See generally United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-33 (1996) [hereinafter
VM/] (citingJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 136-37, n.6 (1994); Mississippi Univ.
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)).
201. See VMf, 518 U.S. at 533.
202. See Brunet v. City of Columbus, 1 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 1993); Conlin v. Blanchard,
890 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1989). In Conlin, white males sued the State of Michigan because
several women were promoted to positions for which white men had applied and were re-
jected. The white men claimed that the women received the positions because of the
operation of the Michigan affirmative action plan. The Michigan plan stated that the effec-
tiveness of an equal opportunity program can be measured by the representation of all
segments of the population in all grade levels in all departments in all areas.
203. See Conlin, 890 F.2d at 816. The Sixth Circuit remanded the case because the dis-
trict court did not address the issue of whether sufficient evidence of past discrimination was
introduced or whether the program was narrowly tailored. See also Brunet, 1 F.3d at 409.
(using the strict scrutiny standard of review, the Sixth Circuit held that the evidence of past
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constitutional soundness, but must be considered in crafting a na-
tional program.
B. Other Circuits-Intermediate Scrutiny for Gender-Based
Affirmative Action Programs
The following discussion examines how the other circuit courts
still employ the intermediate level of scrutiny in analyzing gender-
based affirmative action programs.
1. D.C. Circuit: Insufficient Evidence to Support Link Between Women
Ownership and Diversity Under Intermediate Scrutiny---In Lamprecht v.
FCC,'4 the D.C. Circuit invalidated, as unconstitutional, the FCC
program which considered a woman's gender a plus factor in a
comparative hearing for a broadcast license. This decision was pre-
Adarand and used the Metro Broadcasting intermediate scrutiny
analysis. The Lamprecht court accepted that diversity was an
"important" objective within the government's prerogative. 25 The
question the court decided was whether the government's methods
were "substantially related" to the goal that it hoped to achieve. °8
The rationale for the FCC program was grounded in diversity and
the belief that having more women owners would lead to more di-
verse broadcasting formats. The court held that the FCC did not
establish that its program was "substantially related" to increasing
the diversity of broadcast formats.0 7 The court based its decision
on the statistical data presented which showed that then-existing
women broadcast owners had formats similar to those of male
owners.2°8 In contrast, the broadcast formats for minority-owned
businesses, the court noted, did vary significantly from those of
white broadcasters.0 °
2. Eleventh Circuit: Societal Discrimination Against Women Is Suffi-
cient to Establish "Past Discrimination"'--In Ensley Branch NAACP v.
Seibels,21 the Eleventh Circuit observed that under the intermediate
scrutiny test, the government interest prong can be satisfied by a
gender discrimination presented was too remote-happened prior to 1975--or had already
been remedied by the affirmative action plan.
204 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
205. Id. at 391.
206. See id.
207. See id. at 399.
208. See id. at 398.
209. See id.
210. 31 F.3d 1548, 1565 (11th Cir. 1994).
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showing of "societal discrimination" in the relevant economic sec-
tor."' "[I]ntermediate scrutiny does not require any showing of
governmental involvement.., in the discrimination [that] it seeks
to remedy.",12 The Eleventh Circuit was of the opinion that "[t]he
principal purpose of intermediate scrutiny is not so much to make
sure that gender-based classifications are used only as a 'last resort,'
as it is to ensure that gender classifications are based on reasoned
analysis rather than archaic stereotypes.
2 13
In Ensley no evidence was presented that the gender-based af-
firmative action plan was adopted because of "archaic and
overbroad assumptions about the relative needs and capacities of
the sexes.214 As a result the court decided that "the 'important
government interest' inquiry turns on whether there is evidence of
past discrimination in the economic sphere at which the affirma-
tive action program is directed."2 5 The court found that substantial
anecdotal and statistical evidence of past discrimination against
women was presented, demonstrating an important governmental
interest: eradicating gender discrimination against women in pub-
lic employment.
2 1 6
The court found that the affirmative action plan in question was
not substantially related to the goal of eliminating gender dis-
crimination. The court found that the affirmative action plan
perpetuated gender discrimination because it allowed the City of
Birmingham to continue to use biased exams for hiring and pro-
motion coupled with an affirmative action plan. The plan was
potentially indefinite in duration, which according to the court
would "foster the misguided belief that women cannot compete on
their own.,217
The court believed that the goal of eliminating gender
discrimination required, at a minimum, the development of
gender-neutral selection procedures-possibly used in conjunction
with an affirmative action program designed to remedy dis-
crimination against women .2 The court remanded the case to the
district court, instructing it to (1) set prompt deadlines for the
211. Id. at 1580.
212. Id. at 1581 (quoting Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 932 (9th Cir.
1991).
213. Ensey, at 1581 (citation omitted) (citing Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement
Officers Ass'n, 10 F.3d 207, 217 (4th Cir. 1993) and Contractors Ass'n v. City of Philadel-
phia, 6 F.3d 990, 1010 (3d Cir. 1993)).
214. Id. (quoting Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984)).
215. Id.
216. See id.
217. Id. at 1582.
218. See id.
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development of gender-neutral selection procedures; and (2) stop
using any affirmative "goals" or quotas for women appointments
unless further affirmative action is needed to eradicate lingering
effects of discrimination against women. Because gender goals
need only be "substantially related" (rather than "narrowly
tailored") to their goal, any affirmative action plan need not tie
gender goals to the proportion of qualified women applicants.
219
3. How Much Evidence of "Past Discrimination" Needs to Be Estab-
lished Under Intermediate Scrutiny .- In Engineering Contractors
Association v. Metropolitan Dade County,20° the Eleventh Circuit ob-
served that "a gender-conscious affirmative action program can rest
safely on something less than the 'strong basis in evidence' re-
quired to bear the weight of a race- or ethnicity-conscious
program."221 Quoting the Third Circuit, the court stated that a
"[local government] must be able to rely on less evidence in enact-
ing a gender preference"222 than a racial one. To do otherwise,
according to the court, would eviscerate the difference between
223
strict and intermediate scrutiny.
The Eleventh Circuit held that the evidence of "past discrimina-
tion" presented to justify gender-conscious affirmative action
programs must be "probative" and "sufficient." 24 The court ac-
knowledged that the " 'sufficient probative evidence' standard ...
cannot be measured or described with scientific precision."2 2 5 Be-
cause the evidence of gender disparity presented to the district
court was mixed, the circuit court held that "the district court did
not clearly err in finding that the County had failed to present suf-
ficient probative evidence in support" of its gender-conscious
affirmative action program.226
4. Conclusion: Gender-Based Affirmative Action Programs--This area
of the law is complex and muddled. In the recent VM! decision,
the Supreme Court seems to have elevated the standard of review
in gender discrimination cases. Most circuit courts employ inter-
mediate scrutiny for gender discrimination. The Sixth Circuit is
the sole circuit that uses strict scrutiny to evaluate gender-based
affirmative action programs. The FCC is a national agency whose
219. See id. at 1581-82.
220. 122 F.3d 895 (llth Cir. 1997).
221. Id. at 909.
222. Id. (quoting Contractors Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 990, 1010 (3d Cir.
1993)).
223. See Engineering Contractors Ass', 122 F.3d at 908.
224. Id. at 909.
225. Id. at 910.
226. Id.
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rules and regulations can be challenged anywhere. Therefore, in
crafting any gender-based affirmative action programs and in es-
tablishing the proper factual foundation of "past discrimination,"
the FCC has to be mindful of whether it would pass muster in the
Sixth Circuit.
The FCC could also treat the Sixth Circuit ruling as wrong and
continue to justify gender-based affirmative action programs under
the intermediate scrutiny standard. Given the D.C. Circuit holding
in Lamprecht, the FCC could analyze whether evidence currently
supports a diversity of programming rationale for women. If the
circuit courts follow intermediate scrutiny, the FCC can also rely on
past discrimination against women owners in the telecommunica-
tions industry. Evidence of this discrimination must be "sufficiently
probative" and can be in the nature of societal discrimination in
the relevant economic sector (telecommunications).
CONCLUSION: NAVIGATING ADARAND'S UNRESOLVED ISSUES
Even though the Supreme Court's decision in Adarand has left
many issues unresolved, the FCC still can successfully navigate
through this uncertainty. The FCC has relied primarily on diversity
of voices and viewpoints, diversity of ownership, or evidence of in-
dustry barriers to justify its affirmative action programs. This
justification has now entered the realm of constitutional uncer-
tainty in light of Adarand. Adarand overruled the standard of
review-intermediate scrutiny-used to analyze race-based affirma-
tive action programs in Metro Broadcasting. The Supreme Court has
not addressed whether diversity would be a compelling govern-
mental interest under strict scrutiny. Justice O'Connor's dissent in
Metro Broadcasting (indicating that she would hold the FCC affirma-
tive action program unconstitutional under strict scrutiny) might be
a harbinger of the Court's future direction in this area. Post-Adarand
only one circuit court has found diversity to be a compelling gov-
ernmental interest. The Supreme Court and the circuit courts have
found a compelling governmental interest to exist for those affirma-
tive action programs designed to remedy past discrimination.
Given this legal landscape, the FCC should retain its diversity ra-
tionale227 as a justification for any affirmative action programs that
227. This strategy will allow the FCC to retain a two-pronged litigation strategy that (1)
presumes the diversity of Metro Broadcasting is still a compelling governmental interest; and
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it creates, but combine that diversity rationale with evidence of dis-
crimination. This can be done by showing several things:
(1) minority- and women-owned telecommunications businesses in
pursuit of licenses are more likely to be discriminated against by
bankers, venture capitalists, and others; (2) minority- and women-
owned businesses are more likely to have a different customer base
or broadcasting format; and (3) this different customer base and
broadcasting format causes these businesses to be discriminated
against by others.
For race-based affirmative action programs, the FCC has to iden-
tify and establish that discrimination exists. The discrimination has
to be specified; it cannot be merely the identification of societal
discrimination. It can be discrimination by the FCC against women
and minority licensees. It can be discrimination by the private sec-
tor including: FCC licensees, suppliers, lenders, brokers,
advertisers,2 8 and customers of telecommunications minority-
owned businesses. It can be argued that the FCC is a "passive
participant" in the discrimination by others if a connection is
shown between the private sector's discrimination and the FCC's
policies. There is a connection between the FCC policies encourag-
ing diverse formats and the discrimination that those diverse
formats may face by advertisers. There is also a connection between
financial requirements and the discrimination that potential licen-
sees face from financial institutions in receiving a loan.
The FCC's "passive participation" in discrimination is analogous
to that of a city in hiring contractors. A city uses its tax dollars to
construct something. In Croson, the Court stated that a city could
develop programs to make sure that its tax dollars were not being
used in a discriminatory way. Similarly, the FCC licenses and allo-
cates the radio spectrum to licensees. The FCC is the public trustee
over a limited resource, the spectrum. If the FCC discovers that it is
licensing to an industry that discriminates against minority-owned
and women-owned businesses, it can take steps to remedy this dis-
crimination.
Pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, Con-
gress has the power to remedy discrimination. In Fullilove, the
Court found the race-conscious statute authorizing an affirmative
action plan constitutional. The Court relied on Section Five and
deferred to Congress. Given the Adarand holding requiring federal
race-conscious programs to be evaluated under strict scrutiny, Sec-
(2) assuming arguendo that diversity is not sufficient, presumes that minority-owned tele-
communications businesses encounter discrimination.
228. See Civil Rights Forum on Communications Policy, supra note 10, passim
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don Five deference is now uncertain.2 29 Although the district court
on remand in Adarand used Section Five as the basis for permitting
Congress to adopt affirmative action plans with findings less de-
tailed than a city council, no circuit court has yet addressed this
issue.
The FCC is a government agency created by the Congresss ° and
derives its powers from acts of Congress.23 ' In the area of affirma-
tive action, those acts principally have relied on viewpoint diversity,
ownership diversity, and to a lesser extent barriers to entry. These
acts do not provide sufficient findings of past or present discrimi-
nation to justify an affirmative action program under Adarand. In
addition, at least one senator spoke out against affirmative action
programs in the area of telecommunications ownership, in repeal-
ing the tax certificate program on the ground that there was no
evidence of discrimination against minority-owned businesses. 2
The FCC needs to make detailed findings of past (or present) dis-
crimination against minority-owned and women-owned businesses.
Whether regional findings of discrimination have to be made
is also a question left unresolved by Adarand. In Croson, the Su-
preme Court invalidated an affirmative action plan instituted by
the City of Richmond. The Court criticized the city's plan as too
broad, because it did not limit the coverage to those discrimi-
nated against in the city. The Court held that the city must
compare minority contractors available in the relevant market-
the City of Richmond-to those who won contracts. As a
consequence of the Court's holding, states and municipalities
would have to perform studies to examine discrimination solely
in their region. The Adarand Supreme Court decision did not
address the question of whether regional findings of discrimina-
tion would have to be shown by the federal government. On
229. Two weeks after Adarand was announced, the Supreme Court refused to accord
deference to the Justice Department's interpretation of the Voting Rights Act and struck
down Georgia's congressional redistricting plan under a strict scrutiny analysis. In Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995), the Court pointed to Adarand as indicative of its "presumptive
skepticism of all racial classifications." Id. at 922. The Court refused to accept on its face the
Justice Department's argument that the proposed redistricting plan was necessary to comply
with the Voting Rights Act, noting that it refused to "surrender[] to the Executive Branch
[its] role in enforcing the constitutional limits on raced-based official action." Id. The Court
went on to reject the plan as incompatible with the Congressional intent behind the Act. See
id. at 925-26.
230. See Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1068.
231. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 563, 572-79 (1990) (agencies do not
have the "institutional competence" and explicit "constitutional authority" that Congress
possesses, so FCC affirmative action programs--although established by the FCC on its
own-were considered mandated by Congress through subsequent Congressional action).
232. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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remand, the district court held that Congress addresses national
problems and therefore it is not required to make regional find-
ings. The FCC can argue that it is a national agency that distributes
licenses throughout the country. The FCC does award some
licenses to serve local or regional areas, but anyone-nationwide-
can compete for those licenses. Thus, the FCC can argue that the
appropriate availability pool is nationwide. The telecommunica-
tions industry is not like the market for contractors, which is more
likely to be local or regional-the telecommunications market is
national in scope.
For gender-based affirmative action programs, there is also a
great deal of uncertainty regarding the appropriate standard of
review. Government statutes and regulations that discriminate
against women have historically been scrutinized by courts under
an intermediate standard of review.f 3 Under this standard of re-
view, a court will find these statutes or regulations constitutionally
valid if they are substantially related to an important governmental
interest.
Whether the Supreme Court will continue to follow this stan-
234dard is unclear. In United States v. Virginia, the Court held that
"[p]arties who seek to defend gender-based government action
must demonstrate an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for that
action."235 That phrase permeates the Court's opinion and seems to
suggest a more intense scrutiny than do customary descriptions of
intermediate scrutiny.s Nevertheless the Court expressly dis-
claimed "equating gender classifications, for all purposes, to
classifications based on race or national origin." 
7
The constitutionality of an affirmative action program for
women would also presumably be reviewed under whatever stan-
dard of review that the Court uses for gender discrimination
against women. The Sixth Circuit has held that gender-based af-
firmative action plans are to be analyzed under strict scrutiny.
Other circuits have continued to analyze these cases under inter-
mediate scrutiny. Those courts have held that all that needed to be
shown to satisfy a gender-based affirmative action plan was "societal
discrimination." The Supreme Court has not addressed this issue.
233. See generaUy Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Fron-
tiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-83 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
234. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
235. Id. at 531 (citing JEB v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 136-37 (1994); Missis-
sippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 724)).
236. See id. at 567-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the majority had effectively
adopted a form of strict scrutiny for gender classifications).
237. Id. at 532.
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But even under intermediate scrutiny, the FCC's gender-based
affirmative action program, in the broadcast area, was found un-
constitutional by the D.C. Circuit Court in Lamprecht. The court
held that the FCC did not establish that its program to increase the
number of women owners was "substantially related" to increasing
the diversity of broadcast formats.
The Supreme Court has been clear that past discrimination
(either by the governmental actor or by the governmental actor's
"past complicity" in the discrimination of others) would be suffi-
cient to establish a race-based program. As such, the FCC could use
that as the basis for its gender-based programs. The FCC should
investigate whether women-owned telecommunications businesses
are more likely to be discriminated against by customers, suppliers,
and others. Such studies must address utilization ratios and anec-
dotal evidence. 238 However, anecdotal evidence alone does not
prove discriminatory practices. 29 Studies also have to take into ac-
count that minority- or women-owned firms are more likely to be
small and that may explain some of the disparity. °
The FCC could perform these studies as part of its Market Bar-
rier Entry proceedings. In a report titled In the Matter of Section 257
Proceeding to Identify and Eliminate Market Entry Barriers for Small Busi-
nesses, the commentators, responding to a Notice of Inquiry,
identified the following as barriers to entry to firms owned by mi-
norities and women: cost of capital, unfavorable credit terms, and
lack of transferable telecommunications employment-related op-
portunities.4 ' In the report, the FCC stated that it was commencing
a comprehensive study to further examine the role of small busi-
nesses and businesses owned by minorities and women in the
telecommunications industry, and the impact on the FCC's policies
on access to the industry for such businesses. In the report, the
FCC said that the study would be conducted by an external con-
tractor focusing on broadcast and wireless services. In the wireless
context, the Report indicated that it would focus on licensing by
auction and by other previously used methods. The Report also
stated that the study would analyze the utilization and availability
rates of small businesses, minority-owned businesses, and women-
owned businesses. The FCC stated that these studies would assist it
in reporting to Congress on the implementation of Section 257242
238. See notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
239. Engineering Contractors Ass'n v. Metro Dade County, 122 F.3d 895, 926 (11th Cir.
1997).
240. See id.
241. 11 F.C.C.R. 6280 (1996).
242. 47 U.S.C. § 257(c) (Supp. 1995-1998).
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as to eliminating market barriers and Section 309(j) 43 as to evaluat-
ing the efficacy of auctions. Such studies may help determine
whether any discrimination is occurring against minority- and
women-owned businesses. The outcome of these studies may go a
long way to determining whether there is a compelling govern-
mental interest that will assist the FCC in crafting a narrowly
tailored affirmative action program.
243. 47 U.S.C.§ 309 j) (12) (D) (ii)-(iv) (1994).
